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Abstract—In this paper, we study the problem of band-
width resource allocation in a non-cooperative IEEE 802.16
OFDM/TDMA based wireless mesh network, and propose an
auction based framework in which the gateway, equipped with
the precious high speed Internet connection, serves as the
auctioneer while the first-level mesh routers (MRs) (i.e., those
with direct wireless connections to the gateway) act as bidders
competing resources among each other. We then present Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) based auction approaches to allocate time-
slots among MRs. Through simulations, we find that the pro-
posed VCG algorithms can achieve much better throughput and
connection blocking probability performance than traditional
resource allocation approaches in a non-cooperative environment.
Index Terms—wireless mesh networks, IEEE 802.16,
OFDM/TDMA, resource allocation, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
auction.
I. INTRODUCTION
The research of IEEE 802.16-based wireless mesh networks
(WMNs) [1], [8] have gained enormous popularity recently
due to its capability to improve the capacity and coverage
for wireless broadband services at affordable costs in rural
areas. A typical WMN consists of mesh routers (MRs) that
not only provide wireless access for mesh clients (MCs) but
also form the backbone of the network. To provide broadband
out-bound access, gateways are usually installed between the
mesh backbone and the Internet. Consequently, as shown in
Fig. 1, to provide broadband Internet services to a remote
area, the MRs close to the gateway can work as relay nodes
transmitting traffic between the Internet and the MRs far away
from the gateway.
One of the key enabling features behind such a hierarchical
WMN is that a MR should not only serve the MCs in its
own local cell, but also relay traffic for outer level MRs.
Unfortunately, this kind of cooperation among MRs is not
always practical in reality, especially when these MRs are
owned by different profit-maximizing entities so that they
have to compete with each other for radio resource. In such
a non-cooperative environment, a MR will rationally exhibit
selfish behaviors driven by self-interests in that the MR may
report a bogus channel information or valuation so as to
improve its own benefit [5], or refuse to relay other MRs’
traffic because relaying traffic will inevitably consume its own
resource and consequently degrade the performance of its local
cell. Though these non-cooperative behaviors could improve
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Fig. 1: Structure of a hierarchical wireless mesh network.
the performance for the selfish MR itself, they may lead to
inefficient or unfair resource utilization for the whole system.
Several recent works [3], [8] have addressed the problem of
resource allocation in WMNs, but they are either based on a
cooperative situation or the assumption that the relay node
itself does not have local connections to serve, which are
different from our model where a relay MR should serve both
local and relay connections in a non-cooperative environment.
The resource allocation problem in a competitive envi-
ronment can be effectively addressed by means of auction
theory [6], which is widely known to be efficient in allocating
resources in a non-cooperative situation, and is the focus of
our study. Specifically, in this hierarchical mesh infrastructure,
we assume using an IEEE 802.16 WirelessMAN-OFDM air
interface, where the physical layer is based on orthogonal
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM), and the media ac-
cess control (MAC) scheme is based on time-division multiple
access (TDMA). With OFDM/TDMA, all subchannels are
allocated to one connection at a time. Thus, in our model, the
auction goods are time-slots, the auctioneer is the gateway who
has radio resource, i.e., time-slots, to allocate, and the bidders
are MRs who need to request time-slots from the gateway and
use them for local or relay traffic transmissions.
To implement an auction approach in WMNs, two challeng-
ing problems must be tackled. First, a succinct and expressive
bidding language is necessary. Here, we define a bidder’s
valuation function by quantifying its valuation on the allocated
resource under the current state, and then fully characterize it
simply by a single scalar parameter. Thus, each bidder can
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submit the scalar as its bid, thereby leading to an efficient and
practical bidding process. Second, how should we define “pay-
ment”? In some auction-based algorithms [3], [9], payments
are expressed in terms of money or some kinds of virtual
parameters, and thus, suffer from a lack of practical meanings
and significance. Here we consider associating payment with
the time-slots used by an MR to relay other MR’s packets.
Specifically, to win time-slots allocated by the gateway, a
bidder must “pay” some wireless resources, i.e., time-slots,
and use them to forward an outer level MR’s traffic.
Our contributions are as follows. We first define a linear
valuation function based on time-slots. Consequently, a bid-
der’s utility is just the value it receives minus the assigned
payment. The auction approach based on VCG auction [6] can
then be used to solve this model with linear utility [2]. On the
other hand, we find that a concave valuation function is more
suitable to represent bidder’s valuation and the corresponding
utility because it can represent the saturation of user QoS sat-
isfaction as the received resource increases. Thus, we further
define a family of concave valuation and utility functions, and
derive a Quasi-VCG (QVCG) method, which employs the
VCG allocation and payment policies under this non-linear
environment. Then we compare the performance of these two
VCG-based auction algorithms with some traditional resource
allocation algorithms through simulations, and find that the
proposed VCG algorithms can achieve much better throughput
and connection blocking probability (CBP) performance in a
non-cooperative WMN.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present
the system model and auction model in Section II. Section III
presents and analyzes our proposed VCG auction algorithms.
Section IV gives simulation results. We conclude in Section V.
II. MODEL
A. System Model
In this paper, we consider an IEEE 802.16 OFDM/TDMA-
based WMN with three hierarchical levels as shown in Fig. 1
and focus on downlink resource allocation. Such a hierarchical
network structure is highly practical and can be used to model
a WMN in a rural area, where at Level-0, there is a wireless
gateway that has direct connection to the Internet. There are
N Level-1 MRs, denoted by MRL1i , i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , N},
surrounding the gateway and providing wireless access for
their clients. Each MR and its corresponding clients form a
cell. Outside Level-1, to cover a wide geographical area (a
necessary condition in a rural area), there are N other MRs,
denoted by MRL2i , which are located far from the central
gateway. As a result, each MRL2i does not have direct wireless
connections with the gateway, and it can only get broadband
Internet services through the relaying services provided by
MRL1i . We also assume that MR
L1
i in Level-1 just relays
traffics to MRL2i in Level-2. Every Level-1 MR
L1
i competes
with each other for the bandwidth resource provided by the
gateway.
We assume all cells operate under IEEE 802.16
OFDM/TDMA-TDD mode, and each adjacent cell uses a
different frequency band. The MAC frame is composed of
downlink and uplink subframes. Each downlink subframe
is composed of Td time-slots, each of which is used for
transmission of packets corresponding to one connection. For
uplink and downlink transmission using OFDM, each MR uses
M subchannels with total bandwidth of B MHz. There are
RGL1i packets per time-slot transmitted from the gateway to
MRL1i . We use PER
L1
i and PER
L2
i to denote the average
packet error rates in the downlink of MRL1i ’s and MR
L2
i ’s
local cell, respectively. These PERs depend on the PHY layer
packet transmission error rate and MAC layer packet dropping
rate. Then we can get the average number of packets that
can be transmitted successfully per time-slot from MRL1i and
MRL2i as a
L1
i and a
L2
i , respectively, i.e.,
aL1i = R
GL1
i · (1− PERL1i ) (1)
aL2i = a
L1
i · (1− PERL2i ) (2)
We also assume that there are NL1i MCs served by MR
L1
i ,
and NL2i MCs served by MR
L2
i . Thus, when T
L1
i time-slots
are allocated to MRL1i for its local usage and T
L2
i time-slots
are used to relay Level-2 MR’s traffic, the average received
packets per frame by a Level-1 MC and a Level-2 MC are
then given by:
Q
L1
i (T
L1
i ) =
aL1i
NL1i
· TL1i (3)
Q
L2
i (T
L2
i ) =
aL2i
NL2i
· TL2i (4)
B. Auction Framework
In our proposed auction framework, each MRL1i needs
to compete for time-slots through auction, and the valuation
function can be fully characterized by a scalar valuation
parameter. Specifically, every MRL1i calculates the valuation
parameter aL1i and then submits a bid bi = µi(a
L1
i ) to
the gateway according to a rationally selfish strategy. For
MRL2i , because a
L2
i depends on PER
L2
i and MR
L1
i ’s re-
ported valuation parameter, we assume that every MRL2i
can send PERL2i to the gateway via a secure out-of-band
control channel through MRL1i . After receiving the announced
bidding profile B = {b1, b2, . . . , bN} from every MRL1i ,
and all level-2 PERL2i , the gateway will know each MR’s
reported valuation, and then calculate the allocation T =
T (B) = {T1, T2, . . . , Ti, . . . , TN}, which represents the num-
ber of time-slots allocated to each MRL1i , as well as the
payment P = P (B) = {TL21 , TL22 , . . . , TL2i , . . . , TL2N }, which
represents the number of time-slots that should be used by
MRL1i to relay MR
L2
i ’s traffic. Subsequently, the allocation
and payment results are transmitted to each MRL1i . Upon
receiving them, each MRL1i gets to know T
L1
i = Ti − TL2i
and payment TL2i .
In a typical auction, the utility of a bidder is the value
received by this bidder minus the payment assigned by the
auctioneer. However, in our model, to provide practical mean-
ings for payment, we associate the payment with the practical
radio resource, i.e., time-slots. Thus, when MRL1i receives Ti
time-slots and accept TL2i time-slots as payment, its ultimate
utility is its true valuation when getting TL1i = Ti−TL2i , i.e.,
UL1i (Ti, T
L2
i ) = V
L1
i (Ti − TL2i ) = V L1i (TL1i ) (5)
For Level-2 MRL2i , its utility is just its valuation with TL2i
time-slots, i.e.,
UL2i (T
L2
i ) = V
L2
i (T
L2
i ) (6)
III. VCG AUCTION
A. Classical VCG Based on a Linear Utility Function
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction has been regarded as
one of the most effective mechanisms to induce truth-revealing
strategies [2], i.e., every bidder truthfully declares their re-
source requirements. The VCG theory relies on the restrictive
assumption that bidders’ utility functions are quasi-linear, i.e.,
the utility can be expressed as the value of the goods received
minus the payment made. To fulfill this requirement, we
first design a VCG auction-based algorithm using a linear
utility function, called a Classical-VCG (CVCG) algorithm,
where the valuation function is given by the maximal feasible
received packets per time-slot as discussed in Section I, i.e.,
V L1i (T
L1
i ) = Q
L1
i (T
L1
i ) ·NL1i = aL1i · TL1i (7)
V L2i (T
L2
i ) = Q
L2
i (T
L2
i ) ·NL2i = aL2i · TL2i (8)
Thus, their utilities can be expressed as:
UL1i (Ti, T
L2
i ) = a
L1
i · Ti − aL1i · TL2i (9)
UL2i (T
L2
i ) = a
L2
i · TL2i (10)
Based on the above linear model, we design an auction
mechanism based on the classic VCG theory as follows.
1) Each bidder MRL1i submits its true valuation parameter
aL1i as bid bi to the gateway, i.e., bi = µi(a
L1
i ) = a
L1
i .
2) The gateway computes an outcome that maximizes the
declared social welfare, i.e.,
T ∗ = {T ∗1 , T ∗2 , · · · , T ∗N}
= argmax
{Ti}
∑
i
Vi(Ti) = argmax{Ti}
∑
i
aL1i · Ti (11)
subject to:
(I)
∑
i
Ti = Td (II) 0 ≤ Ti ≤ Td
3) The price paid by each bidder corresponds to the loss
of declared welfare it imposes to the others through
its presence, which is further converted to the number
of time-slots used by MRL1i to forward the traffic to
MRL2i , i.e.,
TL2i = (V
L2
i )
−1(Pi) (12)
where Pi = maxi
∑
j =i Vj(Tj)−
∑
j =i Vj(T
∗
j ).
B. Quasi-VCG Based on a Concave Utility Function
While the above CVCG algorithm based on classical VCG
model is very easy to implement, the linear utility function has
a drawback in that it cannot capture the “diminishing return”
effects in satisfying the QoS requirements of wireless service
users. Specifically, we consider the following logarithmic
function to express a level-1 MC’s valuation on its average
received packets per frame, i.e.,
vL1i (a
L1
i , T
L1
i ) = log(Q
L1
i (T
L1
i ) + 1) = log(
aL1i
Ni
· TL1i + 1)
(13)
Thus, when there are NL1i MCs served by MR
L1
i , its
valuation on TL1i time-slots can be defined as:
V L1i (a
L1
i , T
L1
i ) = N
L1
i ·vL1i (a1i , TL1i ) = NL1i ·log(
aL1i
NL1i
·TL1i +1)
(14)
Similarly, MRL2i ’s valuation on T
L2
i time-slots is:
V L2i (a
L2
i , T
L2
i ) = N
L2
i · log(
aL2i
NL2i
· TL2i + 1) (15)
Thus, according to (8) and (9), their utilities are:
UL1i (Ti, T
L2
i ) = V
L1
i (a
L1
i , Ti − TL2i ) (16)
UL2i (T
L2
i ) = V
L2
i (a
L2
i , T
L2
i ) (17)
Obviously, UL1i is concave on both valuation parameter a
L1
i
and allocated resource TL1i , while U
L2
i is also concave on both
aL2i and T
L2
i . These utility functions are not quasi-linear, im-
plying that they cannot be simply expressed as the difference
between the valuation and payment. Thus, the classical VCG
method cannot be applied directly. In the following, based on
the concave utility function in a non-linear setting, we propose
a novel auction approach employing the VCG allocation and
payment policies.
1) Each MRL1i submits its bid bi = aL1i to the gateway.
2) The gateway computes an outcome that maximizes the
declared social welfare, i.e.,
T∗ = {T ∗1 , · · · , T ∗i , · · · , T ∗N}
= argmax
{Ti}
∑
i
V L1i (a
L1
i , Ti)
= argmax
{Ti}
∑
i
NL1i · log(
aL1i
NL1i
· Ti + 1)
(18)
subject to:
(I)
∑
i
Ti = Td (II) 0 ≤ Ti ≤ Td
3) To determine the payment, the gateway first calculates
the loss of social welfare due to MRL1i ’s presence, i.e.,
Pi = max
i
∑
j =i
Vj(Tj)−
∑
j =i
Vj(T ∗j ) (19)
Pi is further converted to the number of time-slots TL2i
used by MRL1i to relay the traffic to MR
L2
i , i.e.,
TL2i = (V
L2
i )
−1(Pi) (20)
Here, our proposed auction mechanism applies the VCG
allocation and payment policies to a non-linear environment,
and thus we refer it to as Quasi-VCG (QVCG) algorithm.
IV. SIMULATIONS
The simulation topology is shown in Fig. 1, where N =
4 and the frequency bands for adjacent MRs are non-
coverlapping. Each MR has 64 subchannels, and total band-
width is 10 MHz. We further group 25 OFDM symbols into a
slot, and let one downlink-subframe have 10 time-slots. There
are 10 MCs in each cell. The wireless channel is modeled as
frequency-selective Rayleigh fading channel.
We then compare our proposed VCG algorithms with two
traditional cooperative resource allocation methods in our non-
cooperative environment: (1) proportional fairness (PF) [4],
and (2) a global optimization method (GLB) which maximizes
the following function:
T˜ = {T˜L11 , T˜L21 , · · · , T˜L1N , T˜L2N }
= arg max
{TL1i ,T
L2
i }
∑
i
UL1i (T
L1
i ) + U
L2
i (T
L2
i )
(21)
subject to:
(I)
∑
i
Ti = Td (II) Ti = TL1i + T
L2
i
Notice that in a cooperative situation which is unrealistic
in the environment considered in this paper, all MRs report
their true valuations to the gateway, which then allocates
resource based on these true information. However, in a non-
cooperative environment, a selfish MR may report a bogus
valuation to gain a high payoff without regard to the overall
system performance [5]. In our simulations, we assume MRL11
always reports a higher valuation under the PF and GLB
algorithms.
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Fig. 2: System aggregate throughput vs. Level-2 PER.
As can be seen from Fig. 2, the system average throughputs
of PF and GLB are much lower than those of the VCG-based
algorithms. To quantify the service dependability for Level-2
MRs in the system, we assume that each local connection
generates 2500 packets per second in the downlink, and
calculate the Level-2 MR’s connection blocking probability
(CBP) according to Engset formula [7]. As shown in Fig. 3,
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Fig. 3: CBP vs. Level-2 PER.
the CBP performance of PF and GLB are worse than those of
the VCG algorithms. Thus, it is quite clear that the traditional
resource allocation algorithms are not suitable for a non-
cooperative WMN.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study the downlink bandwidth allocation
problem in a non-cooperative IEEE 802.16 OFDM/TDMA-
based hierarchical wireless mesh network. We design an
auction framework to let rationally selfish mesh routers request
time-slots actively and motivate them to forward an outer
level MR’s traffic. We also propose two Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) based auction approaches according to different
valuation functions, and compare their performance with tra-
ditional proportional fair and global optimization algorithms
through simulations. We find that the proposed VCG auction
algorithms can achieve much better performance in terms of
efficiency and service dependability than traditional resource
allocation algorithms in a non-cooperative environment.
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